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This paper is addressed primarily to the effects of the present cor-
porate income tax on the size and composition of aggregate demand
in a depression and to the consequences of reducing or modifying
the tax as an antidepression measure. No attempt is made to in-
vestigate the influence of the tax on the pattern of business organiza-
tion or the possibilities of using corporate taxes to bring about
desirable structural changes in the economy. Although considera-
tions of tax equity and administration enter into the selection of
possible modifications of the tax and their appraisal, the emphasis
on these aspects of tax policy is secondary in the present discussion.
The paper is written on the assumption that raising revenue is a
legitimate objective of taxation. The pure principles of functional
finance do not recognize this objective. But, for both good and bad
reasons, the size of the budget deficit is likely to be a 'matter of con-
cern in the next depression although anxiety on this score will
doubtless be less acute than it was in the 1930's. If this is so, an im-
portant subject of inquiry is the comparative efficiency of various
tax reductions attributable either to cutting tax rates or to modifica-
tion of the tax base. Efficiency in this sense would be measured by
the multiplier effects of a tax reduction—that is, by the relation be-
tween the amount of the tax reduction and the resulting, increase in
aggregate demand. Even if one is unconcerned about the deficit, it
is convenient to have some notion of the probable extent of reaction
to tax changes in order to know where to begin and how large an
application to prescribe.
The main questions to be discussed are: To what extent can the
flexibility of the corporate tax be regarded as an automatic stabilizer?
How do technical features influence built-in flexibility? What would
be the consequences of reducing corporate tax rates in a depression
period? Of reducing liabilities by modifying the tax base? Can cor-
porate taxes be revised to make them more acceptable uiider de-
pression conditions? 1
1 Noaccount is taken in this paper of the general revision of federal tax law em-
bodied in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d sess.),
which was adopted after the paper was written. Among the most important fea-
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Built-in Flexibility
Corporate tax liabilities are directly related to the usual measure of
business success. Hence a firmautomaticallyobtains a reduction of
corporation income tax whenever its operating experience is un-
favorable. Despite considerable diversity among firms, movements in
aggregate profits coincide closely with the general business cycle.2
For the Treasury this means that the yield of the corporate tax will
automatically decline during a recession and rise during a recovery
period. Nearly all taxes exhibit this built-in flexibility to some extent,
but it is more pronounced for the corporate tax than for most other
major taxes. Corporate profits, defined either as the algebraic sum of
all profits and losses or as the total of profits reported by corporations
realizing net income in any year, fluctuate more widely than national
income as a whole or the other major distributive shares.
Built-in flexibility of tax yield is usually considered an automatic
stabilizer of business conditions. In considering the extent to which
this characterization holds for the corporation income tax, it is in-
teresting to try to separate the influence of the fact that the tax is
measured by net income from the timing of liabilities. This point may
be clarified by two comparisons. First, a profits tax may be com-
pared with taxes on sales, gross receipts, units of production, pay-
rolls, or some other base that is more stable than profits. Second,
profits taxes with different degrees of instability of yield may be
compared. For example, a tax based on annual profits might be com-
pared with one imposed on a moving average of profits covering a
whole business cycle. An inquiry of this kind may help to deter-
mine whether it is feasible to approximate the effects of the auto-
matic variability of yield of the corporate tax by adjustments of rates
of other types of taxes and whether it is worthwhile to modify the
corporation income tax to increase its built-in flexibility.
The larger automatic reduction in liabilities under the corporation
income tax is certainly one reason for believing that, during a de-
pression, this tax is less deflationary than sales, production, or cost-
factor taxes that would yield the same amount of revenue over a corn-
tures of this act are: (1)extensionof the carryback of net operating loss from
one year to two years, (2) liberalization of depreciation deductions by allowing
taxpayers the option of using a modified declining-balance method or other
methods which will concentrate a larger fraction of total allowances in the early
years of life of depreciable property, and (3) exclusion from taxable income of
individual stockholders of the first $50 of dividends received and allowance of
a tax credit equal to 4 per cent of additional dividends.
2ThorHultgren, Cyclical Dit,ersities in the Fortunes of Industrial Corpora-
tiorz8, National Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper 32, 1950.
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plete business cycle. The income tax will leave firms more funds for
working capital, fixed investment, and dividend distributions. But
other differences between the two types of tax seem more important.
The corporate income tax will not significantly alter the point at
which short-run marginal costs and marginal revenues are equal and
hence will be less likely to keep below the capacity of
existing plant and equipment. The income tax will interfere less with
price reductions. Although this point is more debatable, it seems
likely that the income tax will be less discouraging to new invest-
ment and to introduction of new products, because management
will know that a tax liability will not be incurred unless and until
profits are realized.
The conclusion that the corporate income tax is less harmful dur-
ing a depression than other types of tax that happen to have less
built-in flexibility does not necessarily imply that increased built-in
flexibility of a profits tax is an important advantage. The only gain
from a mere rescheduling of income tax liabilities over the cycle will
be the increased availability of funds during the depression. The
significance of this point will be further considered in a later section
dealing with the effects of reducing corporate tax rates as an anti-
depression measure. A change in timing of liabilities but not in the
total amount accruing over a cycle would not significantly affect the
rate of return on investment in assets with useful lives as long as the
duration of the cycle. Some technical features of the corporate tax
that determine the degree of its built-in flexibility of yield affect only
the timing of liabilities. Other features also influence the total amount
of tax that a firm will pay over the cycle.
The foregoing paragraphs make no distirkction between tax liabili-
ties and tax yields. In practice, payments of corporate taxes are not
synchronous with accrual, and changes in liabilities precede changes
in collections. Liabilities were formerly paid in equal quarterly in-
stallments in the twelve months following the close of the tax year.
In recent years, however, the date of payment has been advanced.
Ninety per cent of 1953 taxes will be payable in two equal quarterly
installments in the first half of 1954, leaving only 5 per cent to be paid
in each of the last two installments. Liabilities of 1954 and later years
will be payable in two equal installments in the first half of the
following year.
Although the delay in payment m3y sometimes be important for
the corporation's cash position, taxes begin to influence business de-
cisions even before the final accrual of liability. In view of the
comparatively, short lag under present arrangements, in most in-
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stances it is not necessary to consider the difference in of
liabilities and of payments in assessing the effects of built-in flexibility
on business behavior.3
The reasoning that equates built-in flexibility of tax yield with
automatic stabilization does not seem to be fully applicable to the
corporate income tax; The identification is justifiable for the indi-
vidual income tax on the plausible assumption that consumer ex-
penditures ordinarily respond promptly to changes in disposable in-
come. An analogous, assumption regarding business investment is not
admissable; The timing of liabilities may be of secondary importance
in accounting for whatever advantages the corporate tax has under
depression conditions. Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile to examine
some of the techiiical.féatures that influence the built-in flexibility of
the tax. These features may also be important in other respects.
Technical Features Affecting Built-in Flexibility
•The degree of built-in flexibility of the corporate tax depends on
the exact definition of net income, particularly procedures for valua-
tion of inventories and determination of depreciation allowances; the
extent to of one year can be offset against profits of other
years; and the rate structure. All these features affect, to some
extent, the total yield of the tax over the business cycle, but in this
section they will be considered with particular reference to their in-
fluence on the timing of; liabilities. In order. to isolate the signifi-
cance of built-in flexibility, it will be convenient to assume that tax
rates are adjusted so that the yields of different versions of the cor-
porâte tax are approximately equal over a complete business cycle.
VALUATION
Historically, inventory profits and losses have been an important
element in fluctuations of the reported total of profits. Changes in in-
ventory profits Or losses have accounted for the following percentages
of the total change in reported corporate profits before taxes: from
1929 to 1932, 4 per cent of the decline; from 1932 to 1937, 12 per cent
of the rise; from .1937 tO 1938, 34. per cent of the decline; from 1948
to 1949,68 per cent of the decline; from 1949 to 1950, 57 per cent of
the rise.4
As noted below, however, the timing of refunds attributable to loss carry-
backs may be important.:
.
•4lnventory. profits and losses are here taken to. be equal to the inventory
valuation adjustment (for corporations) ..includedin the national income esti-
mates prepared by the Department of Commerce (see National Income Supple-
ment, 1951, Survey of Current Business,. Dept. of Commerce, p. 150).
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These fluctuations were partly attributable to the traditional ac-
counting convention that when particular units cannot be identified
goods should be assumed to be sold in the order of their acquisition.
Under the first-in-first-out valuation method, the lag between as-
sumed cost of goods sold and replacement cost becomes important in
periods of rapidly changing prices. Reported profits are further re-
duced during business recessions by the accounting adjustments
necessary to conform to the common practice of carrying inven-
tories at the lower of cost or market value.
The last-in-first-out method of inventory valuation is intended to
reduce variations in reported profits by shortening the lag in changes
of cost of goods sold behind movements in replacement cost. This
procedure is based on the assumption that the goods sold in any
period are those most recently acquired. Under present law a tax-
payer using Lifo forgoes the privilege of writing down the book value
of inventories if market values fall below original cost. A further
condition of use of Lifo for tax purposes is that the taxpayer's own
books of accounts and reports be on the same basis.
Lifo did not become generally available for tax purposes until
1939, when it was made optional for all taxpayers. Experience with
the method has, therefore, been dominated by war and postwar de-
velopments, rather than by ordinary cyclical movements. In fact, the
procedure does not seem to have been widely adopted. In 1951 the
Department of Commerce estimated that Lifo inventories of cor-
porations represented about one-tenth of the total book value of
nonfarm inventories or about one-eighth of all corporate inven-
tories.5 Later estimates place the book value of Lifo inventories for
manufacturing at the end of 1951 at 15 per cent of the total for
manufacturing industries.° Lifo accounting is concentrated among
large manufacturing, corporations in the fields of iron and steel,
petroleum and coal products, nonferrous metals, paper and pulp,
textiles, food processing, and leather and products, and among de-
partment stores.7
To the extent that it has been adopted, Lifo clearly reduces the
built-in flexibility of corporate tax liabilities. During a recession, re-
ported profits and tax liabilities of firms on Lifo will fall less rapidly
than they would under Fifo. Inability to write down inventories when
the market price of raw materials declines below cost may be
especially significant for some of the manufacturing industries in
.5 Ibid., pp. 123—124.
8JamesP.Daly, "LifoInventoriesandNationalIncome Accounting," Survey
of Current May1953, pp. 16—18.
7 Ibid., and J. Keith Butters, Effects of Taxation: Inventory Accourzting and
Policies, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, 1949, chap. III.
158CORPORATE iNCOME TAX
which Lifo is most widely used. Downward revaluations of in-
ventories were large for such firms in 1921, 1930—1932, 1934, and
1937.8
Theeffect of Lifo accounting on business activity is qualitatively
uncertain, although it may be presumed that it will be quantitatively
unimportant for the economy as a whole so long as Lifo is confined
to the limited area that it now occupies. On the one hand, the cash
position of firms on Lifo will be adversely affected during a recession.
On the other hand, it is possible that the smaller decline in reported
profits will help prevent the development of pessimism and thereby
contribute to stabilization of business outlays.9 I am inclined to be-
lieve that the adverse effect on cash resources will be more important
than any beneficial influence on business sentiment, partly because I
find it hard to believe that executives of firms with large stocks of
raw materials will fail to make a mental adjustment for price changes.
But I do not see how the question can be resolved.
Recent proposals to allow taxpayers using Lifo the option of valu-
ing their inventories at the lower of cost or market prices would
largely eliminate the disadvantage of the method during a recession.
Such an amendment, however, seems objectionable on other grounds.
It would allow taxpayers to minimize taxes on inventory profits when
prices were rising and to take immediate advantage of inventory
losses when prices fell below Lifo valuations. The result would be
discrimination against taxpayers who have refrained from adopting
Lifo partly because of fear that prices would fall, and against firms
for which Lifo is not feasible.'°
CURRENT-COST DEPRECIATION
Unlike Lifo, which was designed to reduce cyclical fluctuations in
taxable profits, proposals for current-cost depreciation allowances for
tax purposes have usually been intended to deal with a condition of
secular inflation or a once-for-all increase in the price level. The
more elaborate of these proposals would allow taxpayers to adjust
depreciation deductions each year by reference to indexes of the
cost of capital goods. Discussion of this subject has already abated in
this country and probably will disappear in the quarters in which it
SAlbertK. Koch, The Financing of Large Corporations, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1943, pp.49—50.
° ProfessorButters stresses the advantage of eliminating the "distorting effects
of inventory profits and losses." Op. cit., p. 11.
10Fora good discussion see Douglas H. Eldridge, "Issues Raised by Proposal
to Grant Cost or Market Option with Lifo," National Tar Journal, March 1953,
pp. 52—68.
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has been popular in the past few years if a significant decline in the
price of capital assets occurs.
If consistently applied, current-cost depreciation resembles Lifo in
that it would reduce cyclical variations in profits and tax liabilities,
but the magnitude of the adjustment is harder to estimate. Although
the book value of depreciable assets is much larger than that of in-
ventories, the average useful life of depreciable property is much
longer than the turnover period for inventories and annual deprecia-
tion charges are small in comparison with sales from inventories. The
changes in costs of depreciable assets over the business cycle are
probably greater than the fluctuations in prices of nonfarm inventory
goods as a whole, but the fact that book values of depreciable prop-
erty represent a wide range of price history means that, in inter-
mediate phases of the cycle, adjustments necessary to convert original
cost to replacement cost would involve both plus and minus items.
To the extent that acquisition of depreciable property is concentrated
in limes of high prices, the present type of depreciation allowance is
correspondingly large, and a shift to a current-cost basis would cut
allowable deductions and increase taxable profits in depression pe-
riods more than it would if acquisitions were evenly distributed over
the cycle. As compared with Lifo, current-cost depreciation would
involve a greater departure from ordinary accounting methods, graver
administrative difficulties, and a sharper clash with usual standards
of equity. Lifo (without the proposed cost-or-market option) rep-
resents merely a change in the convention regarding the order in
which goods are sold; it reduces, but does not eliminate, inventory
profits or losses. Some versions of current-cost depreciation would
completely destroy the link between historical costs and allowable
deductions."
Like Lifo, a consistent scheme for current-cost depreciation allow-
ances would decrease liquidity during a depression but might have
a beneficial influence on business psychology. Current-cost depre-
ciation might be an additional deterrent to investment when prices
are expected to decline, because future deductions would be smaller
than under historical-cost depreciation. Inasmuch as the expecta-
lion of falling prices is always discouraging to investment, it would
be undesirable to reinforce this influence with a tax consideration.
It is true that the other side of this argument is that current-cost
depreciation might offer an inducement to investment when prices
11E.Cary Brown, Depreciation Adjustment for Price Changes, Harvard
Graduate School of Business Administration, 1952, and Richard Goode, The
Corporation Income Tax, Wiley, 1951, pp. 172—178.
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are expected to rise, but under these circumstances there is less need
to encourage investment. Furthermore, it seems likely that business-
men are enough subject to the so-called money illusion that, within
fairly broad limits, they are more concerned about recovery of origi-
nal cash outlays than about the purchasing power of allowable de-
ductions for depreciation. Proposals for an upward adjustment of de-
preciation allowances to reflect a price rise, but without provision
for a downward adjustment when prices decrease, would, of course,
avoid perverse effects during a depression. These schemes are not
considered here, because they appear to constitute special pleading
rather than suggestions for a fundamental reform in the definition of
taxable income.
LOSS CARRYBACKS AND CAFRYFORWARDS
Variability of corporate tax liabilities over the business cycle is
greatly increased if corporations experiencing net operating losses
are allowed to carry back these losses against profits of prior years and
receive refunds of taxes already paid. The carryback produces nega-
tive tax liabilities for many firms in depression years. A carryforward
of net losses, on the other hand, decreases variability of tax liabilities.
Losses 'suffered in bad years reduce liabilities in a later period of
recovery or prosperity. The difference in variability of the govern-
ment's tax revenues, however, may be smaller than the difference
in variability of liabilities. The tax reduction attributable to a carry-
back is in the form of a refund which will be paid .nly after a delay
occasioned by auditing and other administrative steps, and by the
time the refund is paid the recipient may already be earning taxable
profits again. A carryforward, on the other hand, is taken into account
by the corporation itself when it files its tax return and the tax pay-
ment is adjusted accordingly. Carryback refunds may be greatly
speeded by administrative arrangements for prompt payment on a
tentative basis before a return is examined in detail. This was done
immediately after World War II. It may be especially helpful to
small businesses which often lack ready access to credit.
Like any other arrangement that increases built-in flexibility, the
carryback has a desirable effect on liquidity during a recession or
depression. But other aspects of 'the difference between carrybacks
and carryforwards are probably more important.
The tax consequences of a carryback are more certain than those
of a cariyforward. The refund attributable to a carryback can be
estimated as the year progresses and can be closely determined im-
mediately after the end of the year. The value of the carryforward de-
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pends on future income and future tax rates. A further..hazärd is the
possibility that the law will be revised before the carryforward can be
used. In 1932, for example, Congress shortened the carryforward
from two years to one year, and in 1933 it completely eliminated the
carryforward.
With a carryback in effect, a firm with a record of prior earnings
can be sure that if it suffers a loss the Treasury will of
the cost of its current operating expenses, depreciation allowances,
and interest payments. This consideration seems more likely to en-
courage a business to maintain operations and even to acquire new
plant and equipment in a depressed year than the possibility that, at
some time in the future, a carryforward will reduce tax liabilities.
At the present time, federal law allows only a one-year .carryback of
net operating losses but permits a five-year carryforward. This ar-
rangement was adopted in 1950 to replace a two-year carryback and
a two-year carryforward which had been in effect since 1942. It had
been generally agreed that a liberalization of loss offsets was desir-
able. Two main reasons for preferring a carryforward were ad-
vanced: First, the carryforward is administratively simpler since it
does not involve, holding open or reopening old tax returns. Second,
the carryforward is more advantageous to new and .growingbusi-
nesses, whereas the carryback favors established businesses that are
either stable in size or declining. Both these arguments are valid, but
the decision to concentrate on a carryforward seems to have been
unquestionably disadvantageous from the countercydical point of
view.'2
Extension of the carryback would help us prepare for com-
bating a depression. Further investigation is needed to determine the
ideal length of the period. Only a few statistical studies of loss offsets
have been published, and most of these center attention on the carry-
forward.'3 If it is necessary to act before further factual informa-
tion is available, a reasonable compromise might be to restore the
BusinessLoss Offsets, a report prepared jointly by the technical staffs of the
Treasury Department and the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation in
1947, strongly favored the carryforward. The report conceded that carrybacks
might stimulate business during depression more than carryforwards
but concluded that the difference was probably not very great and that neither
was likely to have an important countercycical effect (p. 7).
Foran exception see Morris Beck, "Carryover of Business Losses," National
Tax Journal, March 1953, pp. 69—85. For a sample of identical corporations,
1923—1939, Beck found that the following proportions of losses would have
been offset by the indicated arrangements: two-year carryback, 58 per cent;
two-year carryforward, 19 per cent; five-year carryback, 90 per cent; five-year
carryforward, 76 per cent.
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former balance between carryback and carryforward by allowing
a three-year period for each. Provision for prompt refunds on a tenta-
tive basis would be a desirable feature. Perhaps it would be feasible.
to allow a longer carryforward for new firms as a partial answer to
the criticism that a carryback discriminates against them.
BATESTRUCrUBE
Theexisting degree of built-in flexibility of yield of the corporation
income tax, as distinguished from the excess profits tax, is due almost
entirely to fluctuations in the size of the base rather than to automatic
changes in effective rates. Corporation income tax rates are grad-
uated to only a limited extent, and the average effective rate paid by
corporations realizing profits in any year does not vary appreciably
with the size of profits. The average effective rate of excess profits tax
does respond to changes in business conditions.
Further graduation of the corporation income tax according to the
absolute size of net income or the rate of return on invested capital
would increase built-in flexibility. Both possibilities, however, seem
objectionable on other grounds. Graduation of a corporate tax on the
basis of size of profits is inequitable because it takes no account of
differences in optimum size of firms in various industries or the num-
ber of stockholders. Graduation according to rate of return over-
looks differences in risk. Furthermore, experience with the excess
profits tax has brought to light many practical difficulties in applica-
tion of this, principle. At the present time there seems to be little
support for permanent adoption of rate-of-return graduation. This
feature of the system will disappear with the expiration of the ex-
cess profits tax, now scheduled for December 31, 1953.
APPRAISAL
Lifo inventory valuation, current-cost depreciation, carryforwards
of net operating losses, and a flat rate reduce the built-in flexibility
of corporation income tax liabilities. The following favor built-in
flexibility: Fifo, historical-cost depreciation, carrybacks, and gradu-
ated rates. The countercyclical advantages of appropriate liming of
tax liabilities appear to be genuine, but their quantitative impor-
tance is uncertain. In the present state of knowledge, therefore, the
other advantages and disadvantages of these procedures may ap-
propriately be given primary consideration.
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Reduction of Tax Rates
Perhaps we may assume that the "new economics" has gained
enough acceptance to make it improbable that corporation income
tax rates will be increased in time of depression in an attempt to
maintain declining revenues. If this is so, the question arises whether
the advantage of reducing corporate tax rates would be great
enough to justify recommending this action as a means of lessening
the severity or length of a depression.
The question of what action to take regarding tax rates in time of
depression, like most other issues of tax policy, must be stated and
answered in terms of a comparison of alternatives. This is awkward
because it greatly complicates discussion, but there is no other fully
satisfactory approach. Within the limits of the present paper it will
not be possible to attempt a systematic comparison of alternatives,
the treatment must be recognized as incomplete. I shall, how-
ever, make explicit some judgments about other taxes without trying
to support these opinions in detail.
It is advisable first to adopt some working hypotheses regarding
the short-run incidence of the major taxes. For familiar reasons, it
seems justifiable to assume that, for an interval of at least a few years,
the direct effects of a reduction of the rate of the corporation income
tax would be reflected almost exclusively in higher profits, rather than
in lower prices or higher wage rates. The secondary repercussions,
of course, might influence prices and wages, but these repercussions
would be the consequence of the primary rise in profits after taxes.
This hypothesis is much less subject to challenge than any judgment
regarding the longer-run effects or ultimate incidence of the cor-
porateFortunately, the latter judgment is not needed for present
purposes.
There would probably be general agreement that the immediate
consequences of a reduction of individual income tax rates would be
mainly an increase in disposable income of taxpayers. Contrary to
the impression that might be gained from most public finance
books, the primary beneficiaries of a reduction in excise tax rates are
somewhat harder to identify. Nevertheless, the usual assumption that
relative prices of taxed commodities would fall seems plausible,
especially under depression conditions. There is, however, at least a
reasonable possibility that part of the tax reduction would augment
profits or diminish business losses. The same reasoning applies in the
short run to the employer's share of payroll taxes. The employees'
share is probably reflected in take-home pay. Whether a fall in the
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prices of taxed commodities would involve a decline in the average
level of market prices or would be offset by increases in other prices
would depend largely on what happened to total consumer ex-
penditures and on the elasticity of supply of goods and services for
which demand might increase.
It will hardly be possible to stimulate aggregate demand and
business activity by cutting taxes unless the government maintains its
own expenditures and finances them by expansionary borrowing.
Under these conditions the effectiveness of the tax reduction will
depend on its influence on private consumption and investment.
Only a minor fraction of a reduction in corporation income tax can
be expected to be added to consumer expenditures. First, corporations
will retain part of the additional funds. Corporate savings may well
absorb the greater part of the total. Dobrovoisky found that in the
period 1922—1943 all manufacturing corporations as a group dis-
tributed on the average only about 20 per cent of an increase in net
income after taxes. (The change in profits was measured in relation
to net worth rather than as absolute amount.) There was, however,
a tendency to attempt to maintain dividends when profits fell in the
early 1930's. Dividends were reduced only moderately in 1980 and
sizable amounts were paid in 1931 and 1932, when manufacturing
corporations as a group incurred net deficits.14 If the desire to stabi-
lize dividends holds in a future recession, some corporations may
distribute in dividends a high proportion of the addition to available
profits attributable to a reduction in corporate taxes at that time.
But other corporations, which would otherwise maintain dividends
by drawing on reserves, may in effect save the entire proceeds of the
tax reduction. The net result of these two types of reaction is hard to
predict.
Of additional dividend distributions, only a part, perhaps less than
half; can be expected to be spent for consumption. Some of the divi-
dends will go to nonresidents and nonprofit organizations. The
amount received by resident stockholders will be subject to indi-
vidual income tax at a fairly high marginal rate, and a considerable
fraction of the net increment in disposable income of stockholders
will be saved.'5 Up-to-date estimates of these magnitudes would be
14 Dobrovolsky, Corporate Income Retention, 1915—43, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1951.
15the of the 1941 distribution of dividends and individual income,
1948 individual income tax rates, and information on consumer budgets of
1941, I have es±nated that a change in dividend distributions would be allo-
cated approximately as follows: dividend income of nonresident foreigners
and nonprofit organizations and retained income of taxable fiduciaries, 11 per
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helpful in appraising the effects of a reduction of the corporation in-
come tax.
Reduction of the corporation income tax will have a favorable in-
fluence on the two main determinants of the volume of corporate in-
vestment—the availability of funds and the anticipated return on a
successful investment. The extent of the reaction is hard to guess.
The tax cut will not transform an unprofitable investment into a
profitable one. Hence it may be only a weak stimulus in time of
severe depression, when pessimism is widespread and profound.
Under these conditions measures to revive demand for final output
are required to call forth a general increase in private investment.
Under less extreme conditions the tax cut will move some projects
over the line between acceptance and rejection.
If the tax reduction is announced to be temporary or is generally
expected to be so, it may be much less effective than a permanent re-
duction. The returns on new investment of intermediate or long-term
durability will be expected to be subject to the regular tax once
business recovery is at hand and hence the outlook for these in-
vestments will be improved to only a minor extent if at all.
Some firms that would have been unable or unwilling to obtain
outside financing will undoubtedly make greater investment outlays
because the tax reduction makes more funds available to them from
internal sources. Outside credit and equity capital may also become
easier to get. But, on the average, lack of funds does not seem to be
the main limitation on investment in a depression period. In years of
severe business recession during the period 1919—1939, corporations
partially liquidated their inventories, receivables, and fixed assets.
They used a large fraction of the funds so obtained to reduce in-
debtedness and to distribute dividends in excess of current net in-
come. Large corporations increased the ratio of cash to total assets
and to total payments in the early 1930's.'° A shortage of funds is
most likely to interfere with investment when business enters a
downswing with a large volume of short-term debt. Corporate short-
term debt grew rapidly after the war, except for a minor decline in
1949, and at the end of 1952 was at a historically high level both in
net amount and in relation to long-term debt.'7 However, it repre-
cent; individual income tax liabilities of stockholders, 82 per cent; individual
savings, 19 per cent; consumption and gifts and contributions, 39 per cent. Goode,
op. cit.,p.108. Needless to say, these estimates are based on many assumptions,
some of them rather shaky.
Friedrich A. Lutz, Corporate Cash Bakinces, 1914—43, National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1945.
Survey of CurrentBusiness,October 1950, P. 10, and September 1953, p. 17.
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sents a smaller fraction of income originating in corporate business
than in 1929 or 1987.18
Adrawback to cutting corporate taxes as a means of stimulating
demand during a recession or depression is the possibility that a
large fraction of the tax remission will be used to reduce short-term
indebtedness or to increase idle reserves. When the business out-
look is highly uncertain or when prices are expected to fall these uses
may be the most prudent applications of funds for many firms. All-
though an increase in business liquidity and a reduction in fixed
charges may be helpful, it. seems unlikely that they will offer as much
support to economic activity as an equal increase in spending power
of individual consumers.
As compared with a reduction of corporate tax rates, a cut in the
rates of the individual income tax, payroll taxes, or excises can be
expected to offer a much greater stimulus to consumption. This
judgment is based mainly on the hypothesis that the corporate tax
has less direct effect on disposable income of consumers or its pur-
chasing power. It does not depend on an assumption that the mar-
ginal propensity to consume of stockholders is lower than that of
other groups. If, however, the marginal propensity to consume is
inversely related to the size of family income, this factor will tend to
widen the difference between the corporation income tax and the
other taxes inasmuch as dividend receipts are highly concentrated in
upper income groups.
Reduction of the individual income tax, excises, or payroll taxes
will probably stimulate some additional private investment. But the
direct effects on this component of demand are likely to be smaller
than those attributable to a change in the corporate income tax.
In summary, it appears that a reduction of the corporate tax rate is
always a relatively ineffective means of stimulating consumption. Its
influence on is less certain but is likely to be weaker dur-
ing a depression than in a period of recovery or prosperity. lEf the
tax reduction is expected to be temporary, its force will be diminished
because it will not significantly improve the anticipated return on
long-lived investments. These considerations suggest that a reduc-
tion of corporate tax rates is a less promising antidepression measure
than a cut in other major taxes.
Rapid Amortization
An alternative to a change in tax rates as a means of reducing the
corporation income tax is to allow rapid amortization or accelerated
18NationalIncome Supplement, 1951, Survey of Current Bu$iness, p. 156.
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depreciation. Several countries have experimented with this method
of removing obstacles to private investment. The United States
adopted rapid amortization of emergency facilities during World
War II and again during the Korean war in order to prevent high tax
rates from interfering too much with selected types of investment.
Could this technique be successfully employed for a similar pur-
pose under depression conditions?
Rapid amortization of new depreciable property will result in an
immediate reduction in reported profits and tax liabilities, by an
amount depending on provisions of the particular scheme and the
volume of eligible investment. If aggregate deductions are limited to
original cost, the larger deductions allowed in the early years of use-
ful life of an asset will be offset by smaller reductions in later years.
With constant tax rates there will be a redistribution of tax liabilities
over time rather than an outright reduction with respect to the in-
come attributable to any one asset. So long as the plan remains in
operation the Treasury will not recover its original loss of revenue,
unless the rate of new investment in eligible assets declines. An in-
dividual firm can enjoy contjnued tax exemption by acquiring new
assets as soon as the old ones are written off. If, however, rapid
amortization is terminated once recovery has been attained, tax post-
ponement will come to an end and the Treasury will begin to recoup
the earlier loss of revenue.
The objective in granting a tax reduction in the form of accelerated
depreciation rather than by a cut in tax rates would be to encourage
investment in depreciable assets as distinguished from accumulation
of idle reserves, debt retirement, additions to inventories, or other
uses of funds. The first step in appraising this device is to consider
its value as an investment incentive.
If tax rates are constant and all firms have enough operating in-
come to absorb the extra deductions, the tax postponement due to
rapid amortization would be equivalent to an interest-free advance of
funds from the government. This would mean a small increase in the
rate of return on the investment. It would also ease the financial
position and working capital problems of a firm expanding its
depreciable assets. But a more important aspect of accelerated de-
preciation would be the fact that it would reduce the risk that the
income tax would interfere with recovery of the capital invested in a
new asset.
Businessmen are accustomed to subject future earnings to a heavy
discount because of their uncertainty. This attitude is reflected in
repeated reports that most firms will undertake a new investment
only if it promises to pay for itself within a rather short time. Corn-
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monly this "payoff period" is said to be about three to five years for
machinery of a type that is usually considered to have a normal
useful life of ten to twenty years. The insistence on the short payoff
period implies that uncertainty is so great that the possibility of re-
ceiving earnings after the end of the period is not worth taking into
account.
The corporate income tax makes it harder to recover the cost of an
asset during its payoff period because depreciation allowances are
based on the longer normal useful life. The greater the discrepancy
between the payoff period and the depreciation period, the more re-
pressive is the tax at any given rate. Since creditors are likely to adopt
somewhat the same attitude toward the future as investors, the tax
will also make it harder to borrow to finance acquisition of depre-
ciable property when the depreciation period is longer than the pay-
off period (and the maturity of the loan).
By narrowing or eliminating the difference between the payoff
period and the depreciation period for tax purposes, accelerated de-
preciation will lessen the tax obstacle to investment. It will not
wholly eliminate tax deterrents, inasmuch as the net return above
cost will still be subject to taxation.
It seems clear that, in a period of stable prosperity when tax rates
are high and are not expected to change, introduction of rapid
amortization will offer a significant stimulus to investment in de-
preciable property. Under depression conditions and with the pos-
sibility that profits will be larger and tax rates higher at some future
time, the measure will probably be much less effective. First and
most important, rapid amortization, like a cut in tax rates, does noth-
ing to increase the gross yield of an investment. Rapid amortization
will not induce investments which would be unattractive even in the
absence of income taxes. Second, if tax rates are expected to be higher
in the future, it may be disadvantageous to accelerate depreciation
deductions. This suggests that a policy of countercyclical changes in
tax rates will partially cancel the benefits of accelerated depreciation
as an antidepression measure. Third, anticipated earnings may be
too small to absorb deductions in excess of normal depreciation al-
lowances over the shortened amortization period.
The significance of the third point depends on the availability of
loss carrybacks or carryforwards and the form of the accelerated de-
preciation arrangement. Even when current profits are low or non-
existent, additional depreciation deductions may produce a tax bene-
fit if they result in accounting losses that can be offset against profits
of past or future years. For firms with a record of profits in the recent
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past, a carryback will assure a tax refund, whereas a earryforward
offers only a contingent benefit. In the absence .of provisions for.
averaging profits and losses, a compulsory plan for systematk ac-
celerated depreciation might actually discourage investment in a
period of low profits. This effect could be minimized by making rapid
amortization optional with the taxpayer or by giving taxpayers free-
dom to write off depreciable property at any rate that is conven
ient.
Three forms of systematic accelerated depreciation may be dis.
tinguished: (1) an "initial allowance" equal to some fraction of the
cost of new assets with the remaining cost written off according to
normal depreciation practices; (2) amortization of new depreciable
property over a fixed period without regard to normal useful life;
(3) amortization allowances for the new assets equal to some mulU-
pie of normal depreciation. These plans could,be combined in various.
ways. The initial allowance has been used, in combination with a.
normal declining-balance depreciation computation, in the United
Kingdom, Canada, India, and some other countries. Amortization.
over a period of sixty months, with the possibility of a still shorter
period under stated circumstances, has been the provision applied to.
emergency facilities in the United States. So far as I know, the, third
method has not been generally adopted by any large country.
A uniform initial allowance and a uniform amortization perio.d for
all assets, as well as complete flexibility for the taxpayer, favor in-
vestment in long-lived assets as compared with short-lived assets.
The increase in deductions will be proportionately larger for the
long-lived assets. This feature might cause some distortion in invest-
ment patterns, but in part it would only compensate for the greater
risk associated with long-term investment. Itis also true that the
heavy capital goods industries and construction are likely to be most
adversely affected by a depression. Hence, investment in these types
of assets would stand in greatest need of a tax fillip. Application of a
uniform multiplier to normal depreciation allowances will shorten
the amortization period by the same fraction for all types of assets
and in that sense can be considered neutral as regards long-lived.
assets.
Administrative and compliance problems associated with adoption.
and termination of rapid amortization probably would not be much
greater than in connection with. countercydical changes of tax rates..
In order to prevent tax avoidance, it would be advisable.to. tax gains
from sales or exchanges of depreciable property (at least to the
extent of the difference between book values under accelerated .de-.
265CORPORATE INCOME TAX
preciation and under normal depreciation) at regular income tax
rates rather than at capital gains rates. In the absence of such a rule;
taxpayers could effect a tax saving merely by exchanging assets.
There is a strong presumption that, in proportion to the amount of
revenue sacrificed, rapid amortization would stimulate more new
investment than a reduction of corporate tax rates. The concession
would be tied directly to the acquisition of depreciable assets, and
the amount of tax revenue lost would depend on the volume of new
investment. Nevertheless, part of the tax reduction would be "wasted"
because some of the investment eligible for accelerated depreciation
would have been made without that privilege. Some of the tax saving
would go into idle reserves, but it seems likely that this fraction would
be smaller than under a general reduction in the corporate tax rate.
Rapid amortization would benefit most those industries in which
depreciation constitutes a large part of total costs. In general, these
are the industries that have suffered most in past depressions.
The stabilizing potentialities of adjustment of depreciation allow-
ances as an alternative to countercycical changes in tax rates deserve
further study. Attention might well be given to the possibility of re-
ducing or postponing normal allowances when inflation threatens as
well as to accelerated depreciation in time of depression.
Taxation of Undistributed Profits or Uninvested Funds
An alternative to reduction of corporation income tax rates or
liberalization of depreciation allowances would be basic revision of
the method of taxing corporations. One approach would be to restrict
the corporate tax to retained profits by transforming it into an undis-
tributed profits tax or a withholding tax. Despite important differ-
ences in form, these two substitutes are fundamentally similar, and
for present purposes attention can be confined to the undistributed
profits tax This measure has usually been advocated as a reform ap-
propriate for all phases of the business cycle rather than as a means
of alleviating depression. It raises a number of controversial issues
that will not be examined Brief attention will be given, how-
ever, to some of the economic implications of the undistributed prof-
its tax during a depression. A tax on uninvested funds of corpora-
tions, either as an addition to the present corporate tax or as a partial
substitute for it, will also be considered as an antidepression measure.
The United States experimented with an undistributed profits tax
19SeeThe Postwar Corporation Tax Structure, Dept. of the Treasury, 1946,
and Goode, op. cit., Chap. 10.
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in 1936—1937. The tax appears to have been an important stimulus
to distribution of dividends in those years.2° It is uncertain to what
extent this reaction was peculiar to conditions of the times or to par-
ticular features of the statute, but it is clear that the tax would always
exert pressure to distribute net profits.
Additional distributions of cash dividends would increase dis-
posable income of stockholders and raise consumption expendi-
tures. This effect would be desirable during a depression but unde-
sirable under inflationary conditions. On the other hand, the liquidity
of corporations would be reduced, and their ability to finance invest-
ment from internal sOurces would be impaired. This wOuld par-
tially. or wholly offset the influence on consumption.
If the statute allowed a credit for stock dividends as well as cash
dividends, as the 1936 act did, some àorporations would be able to
escape liability without jeopardizing their cash position. Other cor-
porations, especially closely held ones, might arrange with their
stockholders for reinvestment of part of the funds paid out in cash
dividends. It is also 'possible that more generous dividend policies
would improve the market for new equity securities. But this is
doubtful, inasmuch as stock prices may be more closely related to
earnings available for dividends than to 'dividends paid. In any event,
if corporations succeeded in avoiding a reduction in the resOurces
available for financing new investment and for building up reserves,
the undistributed profits tax would fail as a stimulant to consumption.
The effect of the undistributed profits tax on the combined total of
investment by corporations and consumption expenditures by stock-
holders seems too uncertain to justify recommending the measure as
one especially suitable for depression conditions. Furthermore, if the
tax is held to be desirable for depression use because it promotes
sumption without ,greatly restricting investment, there is a pre-
sumption that it would be undesirable when the fiscal problem is tO
control inflation. In view of the complex and controversial nature of
the undistributed profits tax there are strong objections to alternate
imposition and suspension of the tax in different phases of the
business cycle. This negative report on the value of the undistributed
profits tax as an antidepression measure is not intended to suggest
that it would' be inappropriate to adopt the plan during a depression
if it were considered a desirable permanent revision of the revenue
system. Whether the tax qualifies as such is not considered in this
paper.
20GeorgeE. Lent, The Impact of the Undist'ributed Profits Tax,1936—1937,
Columbia University Press, 1948, Chap. II, and Dobrovoisky, op.cit.,pp. 57—62.
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In the late 1980's and in the discussion of postwar tax plans some
attention was given to the possibility that a tax on "idle" funds of
corporations would be more effective than the undistributed profits
tax as a check on excessive savings and would not be subject to the
same disadvantages as the latter. This tax was proposed as a levy on
net profits plus current accruals to depreciation and depletion re-
serves but with deductions for dividend distributions and for new
investment. The objective would be to apply a tax pressure against
accumulation of inactive funds, whether from net profits or de-
preciation and depletion reserves, and in favor of dividend distribu-
tion and investment. If this pressure proved ineffective, the govern-
ment would realize revenue from a tax that would not directly en-
croach on private investment or consumption.
A technical problem would be presented by the choice of a defini-
tion of "investment" and its application. A narrow definition would
take in only depreciable or depletable property but would include
outlays for replacement as well as expansion. A broader concept
would include land, inventories, and accounts receivable. Securities
would presumably not be an acceptable type of investment. Financial
businesses would probably have to be exempted from the tax.
The most serious difficulty in devising a satisfactory tax on unin-
vested funds would be to make appropriate allowance for the differ-
ence in timing of fund accrual and investment outlays. Some busi-
nesses are accustomed to replace their assets at a fairly steady rate
because the durability, age distribution, and size of individual prop-
erty items allow this. These firms could also follow a policy of grad-
ually expanding their physical assets. Other firms, however, neces-
sarily have an irregular pattern of replacement or expansion, because
their properties are long-lived and consist of a relatively small num-
ber of large units (hotels and real estate corporations are examples of
this type of business). The first type of firm could adjust its invest-
ment outlays to the volume of retained profits and depreciation ac-
cruals and thereby avoid tax liability. The firm with an irregular in-
vestment pattern might become liable for the tax because it needed
to accumulate funds over a period of years to finance a large outlay
for replacement or expansion.
One way of dealing with the timing problem would be to allow a
long period of averaging by means of carrybacks or carryforwards of
investment outlays in excess of current accruals of funds. But this
would introduce an important element of discrimination against firms
that had made large investments just before the tax went into, effect
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as compared with firms investing immediately thereafter. The former
might be faced with a tax liability, while the latter would enjoy a
carryforward sufficient to wipe out liability for many years. In fact,
with a sufficient carryforward, the provision for inclusion of depre-
ciation and depletion accruals in the tax base would become virtually
meaningless because the original investment would result in a carry-
forward equal to all future accruals to depreciation and depletion re-
serves. While a carryforward or carryback would seem essential for
equity reasons, it would greatly diminish the effectiveness of the tax
in time of depression because accruals of funds in such a period could
be offset by investment outlays made during prosperity.
It might be possible to solve the technical problems associated
with a tax on uninvested funds if enough serious study were given to
the subject. Even so, the tax would be appropriate only for a condi-
tion of secular stagnation and not as a means of helping counteract a
brief depression. It would be much too cumbersome a machine to
start and stop at frequent intervals.
Summary of Conclusions
The principal conclusions of this paper may be summarized as
follows:
1. The marked built-in flexibility of corporation income tax liabili-
ties does not mean that the tax is a powerful automatic stabilizer of
business activity. The advantages of the corporate tax during a de-
pression are probably due more to the fact that it is based on net
income than to timing of liabilities as such. Nevertheless, built-in
flexibility is a desirable feature.
2. Built-in flexibility could be increased by elimination of Lifo in-
ventory valuation, by lengthening the carryback of net operating
losses and shortening the carryforward, and by graduation of rates.
In view of the uncertain importance of timing of corporate tax liabili-
ties, however, it may be justifiable to evaluate these measures pri-
marily in the light of their other advantages and disadvantages.
3. A temporary reduction of corporation income tax rates will
probably increase private spending less during a depression than a
temporary cut in the individual income tax, excises, or payroll taxes.
It will be much less effective in stimulating consumption. A tem-
porary reduction of corpor2te taxes will be less favorable to invest-
ment than a permanent reduction because it will not greatly improve
the anticipated return on long-lived assets. In a severe depression,
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lowering of corporate tax rates may have little influence because
there are comparatively few investment opportunities that seem to
promise any net profit.
4. In proportion to the amount of revenue sacrificed, rapid amorti-
zation of depreciable property can probably do more to improve in-
vestment incentives than a general reduction of corporate tax rates.
Carrybacks or carryforwards of accounting losses or other elements
of flexibility will be essential to allow realization of the full benefits
of rapid amortization and to prevent it from actually discouraging
some investment in time of depression.
5. Neither an undistributed profits tax nor a tax on uninvested
funds of corporations appears to be a promising means of combating
a short depression. The former would probably bring about some in-
crease in consumption expenditures but would make internal financ-
ing of investment more difficult. The latter presents some unsolved
technical difficulties. Both measures would be undesirable when
fiscal restraints on private spending were appropriate, and they are
too cumbersome to apply and remove in different phases of the busi-
ness cycle.
COMMENT
A. MUsCRAVE, University of Michigan
In commenting on this very interesting and constructive paper, I
shall concentrate on a couple of points which leave me worried and
which may stand further discussion. Most puzzling, perhaps, is the
proposition that little can be expected, in terms of increased invest-
ment, from a reduction in the rate of the corporation tax. This, to be
sure, is the prevailing opinion, and I am inclined to share it; but I
don't quite know why, and feel uneasy about the matter.
To begin with, note an important distinction between possible in-
ducements to investment by reducing the corporation tax and in-
ducement to consumption by reducing the personal income tax. In
the case of the personal income tax, the consequences of tax change
take the form of income effects' and the same holds pretty much for
conventional excises, the substitution effect of which is of mInor im-
portance insofar as consumption as a whole is concerned. Because
we deal with the income effect, we know (1) that the resulting initial.
gain in consumption or "multiplicand". cannot exceed the reduction
'Substitution effects on work effort are a different matter and may be neglected
in this connection.
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in yield, and (2) that a decline in yield will have a favorable leverage
effect, no matter whether this decline is due to a reduction in the tax
rate or to a shrinkage in the tax base.
In the case of the corporation income tax, expenditures may be
affected in two ways. As the tax is reduced, the corporation is left
with more investable funds. If we assume that investment is a func-
tion of retained funds, the argument is quite analogous to the pre-
viously considered consumption effects of cuts in personal taxes. The
only difference is that a propensity to invest is substituted for a
propensity to consume. This propensity to invest or "liquidity"
theory of investment behavior seems to underlie much of the recent
tax discussion, especially the optimistic view of accelerated depre-
ciation. The trouble with this theory is that it is more likely to work
in the boom, when you don't need it, than in the depression, when
you want it.
In any case, changes, in available funds are only one aspect of the
matter. Investment behavior, surely, also involves profit prospects
as a determining factor.. These prospects, of course, are prospects net
of tax. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the substitution effect of
tax changes on the profitability of investment. Profits, after all, are
doubled if a tax of 50percent is repealed; or they are raised by 50
per cent if the tax rate is cut by one-half. What puzzles me is why we
feel that investment might not be encouraged substantially by such
a rather drastic change in profitability.
Here the principle involved is quite different from that of the in-
come tax. Resulting changes in the level of investment need not bear
any particular relation to the loss in yield; they may fall short of this
loss or be a multiple thereof. Also, we know that a favorable substi-
tution effect can result only from a reduction in the tax rate,notfrom
a shrinkage in the profits base. Built-in flexibility, in other words,
works only with regard to the income effect; it does not work (ex-
cept where rates are progressive) with regard to the substitution
effect.
Why is it that so little is expected of the substitution effect?
Among a number of possible explanations, these might be offered:
(1) To the extent that the corporation tax is shifted anyhow, re-
ducing the tax rate will not affect investment, be it via income or
via substitution effect. Pending an empirical study of the matter,
I am still far from convinced by the usual view (adopted in Goode's
paper) that the entire tax stays put in the short run. As I see it,
there are many arguments, wholly compatible with conventional
price theory, which permit the possibility of shifting. (2) Perhaps
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the fault lies in the very premise that a tax on profits reduces, and
that removal of a tax increases, investment "yield." While this
seems to be the case at first glance, the actual problem is much
more complex. If perfect loss offset is assumed to exist, imposition
of a tax may be shown to reduce the risk of loss as well as the
prospect of yield.2 Thus, the attractiveness of risk taking remains
unaffected. But it does not follow necessarily that more cash will
be held. In all, we must admit that we have little to go on when it
comes to investment theory. The crude L =f(M)and I =f(I)
functions usually employed tell us little. The whole problem is how
they are affected by the imposition of a tax on investment income;
and to answer this, a much more explicit theory is needed. (3)
Finally, the explanation may be that the investment schedule is
highly inelastic to yield. To the extent that this is true, the increase
in investment induced by reduction in tax rate will not be able to
offset such reduction in investment as results from a downward
shift in the investment schedule during depression. If this is the
case, the effectiveness of• tax reduction falters at the same obstacle
as does monetary expansion—although the latter may have the
additional handicap of a highly elastic liquidity preference sched-
ule.
Evidently, this is an area in which much work needs to be done.
Until empirical results are obtained little can be said in an authori-
tative way. Nevertheless, I feel rather skeptical about the heavy
emphasis on the liquidity approach to investment (with its stress
on accelerated depreciation) and about the de-emphasis of the
substitution effect part of the problem. What we are doing, per-
haps, is to apply boom psychology to a depression problem.
Second, I have been much interested in Goode's treatment of
price level change. On equity grounds, there would be an advantage
to having income defined, in real terms, provided that this could be
done consistently.3 But, as Goode shows, corrections in the tax
base, working in this direction, will reduce built-in flexibility of
tax yield. This consideration, to be sure, is disturbing only if we
take the available funds approach to investment behavior; under
a profitability approach, adjustment for price level change may con-
tribute to stabilize investment. Also, there is the bothersome thought
2 For an elaboration of the risk approach, see E. D. Dornar and R. A. Musgrave,
"Proportional Income Taxation and Risk Taking," QuarterigJournal ofEco-
May 1944.
3 Advocates of replacement cost depreciation usually overlook the facts that
similar adjustments may be applied to other items on the balance sheet and that
an analogous problem arises for personal taxpayers.
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that built-in flexibility is a fine thing when you are at the top; but
it is not so attractive after income has declined and you are trying
for a recovery.
This, among other considerations, suggests the possibility of
using different definitions of taxable income at different stages in
the cycle. On the whole, I share Goode's skepticism toward such
an approach. If we want a tax structure which is neutral as between
investment in different firms, we need to work out an income con-
cept which meets these requirements and then leave it alone, while
using adjustments in tax rates as our major anticycical device.
Perhaps Goode iscorrect in. suggesting that anticyclical ad-
justment in depreciation rates is a proper exception to this rule, but
I am not as optimistic regarding its effectiveness. Remember that
recent years have been just the setting in which accelerated depre-
ciation could be most effective. For one thing, investors looked
forward to a subsequent decline in tax rates, a factor which more
than anything else makes accelerated depreciation desirable to the
investor. For another, investment was booming, thus emphasizing
the gain-in-liquidity aspect of accelerated depreciation. Should a re-
cession set in, neither of these, factors would be present, and the
effectiveness of accelerated depreciation would be greatly reduced.
Certainly it is a policy which will be more helpful in maintaining
than in restoring a high level of activity.
Nevertheless, Goode is probably correct when he concludes that
per dollar of yield lost, the incentive to investment will be greater
from accelerated depreciation than from a reduction in the tax rate.
This, perhaps, is primarily due to the fact that accelerated depre-
ciation will apply to new investment only, whereas the reduction
in tax rate would apply, presumably, to earnings from old invest-
ment as well. Perhaps the main merit of accelerated depreciation
is that it furnishes us with an administratively feasible way of giv-
ing preferential treatment to new investment.
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